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PANEL I: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
IN CONTEXT 
THE DANGEROUS THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Jack M. Balkin* and Sanford Levinson** 
Through most of its history, the Thirteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted extremely narrowly, especially when compared to the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. The Thirteenth 
Amendment has been read in this way because it is “dangerous.” The 
demand that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist 
within the United States,” taken seriously, potentially calls into question 
too many different aspects of public and private power, ranging from 
political governance to market practices to the family itself.  
Our contemporary association of “slavery” with a very limited set of 
historical practices is anachronistic and the result of a long historical 
process. Yet at the time of the founding, the concept of “slavery” was far 
broader than currently understood. “Slavery” meant illegitimate domi-
nation, political subordination, and the absence of republican govern-
ment; “chattel slavery” was only the most extreme and visible example of 
slavery.  
The broader, antirepublican concept of slavery was narrowed to 
avoid awkward comparisons to the economic and political subordina-
tion of wage laborers and women. Once chattel slavery was abolished, 
labor activists and suffragists sought to revive the older, broader concept 
of “slavery.” But emancipation allowed defenders of the status quo to 
insist that American society was now “free.” Even today, calling an 
injustice “slavery” is generally seen as overheated hyperbole and even a 
presumptuous insult to the memory of the victims of African American 
chattel slavery. This Essay concludes by asking how our political 
imagination has been limited as a result of this history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the ironies of the U.S. Constitution is that although it was 
clearly designed to accommodate the interests of slaveholding states, the 
word “slavery” first appears in the Constitution in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which claims to abolish slavery forever. Given its text—and 
the background context of 250 years of American history—the 
Thirteenth Amendment seems to portend a major transformation in 
both law and society: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”1 Moreover, Section 2 of the Amendment gave Congress its 
first new enumerated power since 1787: the “power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.”2 
What is noteworthy, however, is that although the text of the 
Thirteenth Amendment seems to promise much, it has, over its 150-year 
lifespan, delivered remarkably little beyond the initial elimination of 
African American chattel slavery. With few exceptions, the United States 
Supreme Court has read the Thirteenth Amendment, and especially 
Section 1, quite narrowly, at least in comparison to other amendments—
including, most significantly, its immediate successor, the Fourteenth.3 
Consider, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 1988 summary of 
Thirteenth Amendment doctrine: “The primary purpose of the 
Amendment,” O’Connor explained, “was to abolish the institution of 
African slavery as it had existed in the United States at the time of the 
Civil War, but the Amendment was not limited to that purpose.”4 What 
else, then, is included? O’Connor explains that the addition of the ban 
on involuntary servitude “was intended to extend ‘to cover those forms of 
compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation 
would tend to produce like undesirable results.’”5 Thus, O’Connor con-
cluded, “our precedents clearly define a Thirteenth Amendment 
prohibition of involuntary servitude enforced by the use or threatened 
                                                 
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. 
2. Id. § 2. 
3. One might also compare the Nineteenth Amendment, which, like the Thirteenth, 
was the product of sustained social movements. Each has left relatively few traces in either 
case law or even the operative rhetoric of American political discourse. Reva Siegel has 
pointed out that a narrow reading of the Nineteenth Amendment was by no means re-
quired by the Amendment’s text, even though its language is arguably narrower than that 
of the Thirteenth. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 953 (2002) (observing that 
immediately after ratification, “some courts understood the Nineteenth Amendment to 
have implications for practices other than voting, . . . [but] soon thereafter the 
Amendment came to be interpreted as a nondiscrimination rule governing voting with no 
bearing on questions of women’s citizenship outside the context of the franchise”). 
4. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).  
5. Id. (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)) (emphasis added). 
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use of physical or legal coercion.”6 Nevertheless, O’Connor cautioned 
that “[t]he guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never 
been interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other 
means, such as psychological coercion.”7 Presumably the Amendment 
does not protect people from being pressured to accept even the most 
toilsome—and inadequately rewarded—labor out of fear of absolute 
privation or starvation. O’Connor noted that the Thirteenth Amendment 
might someday mean more than this, but she was simply explaining what 
the Court had so far held in the first 120 years of the Amendment’s 
existence for purposes of applying a specific federal criminal statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 241, which punishes conspiracies to violate established constitu-
tional rights.8 
It is worth emphasizing how narrow this interpretation is. Compare 
it with the evolving jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, 
among other things, was originally designed to establish equal citizenship 
for blacks and whites and to make unconstitutional the Black Codes, 
state laws that had sought to return the newly freed men and women to 
conditions little better than chattel slavery.9 Suppose that in 1988 the 
Court had summarized 120 years of Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence by asserting that the Equal Protection Clause extended only “‘to 
cover those forms of [denials of rights and liberties] . . . akin to [the 
Black Codes] . . . which in practical operation would tend to produce like 
undesirable results.’”10 Most people today would find this interpretation 
implausibly narrow, almost a parody of originalist argument.11 If the 
                                                 
6. Id. at 944.  
7. Id.  
8. See id. (“We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.”). Section 241 “creates no substantive rights, but 
prohibits interference with rights established by the Federal Constitution or laws and by 
decisions interpreting them.” Id. at 941. Fair warning requires that convictions under 
§ 241 show “intentional interference with rights made specific either by the express terms 
of the Federal Constitution or laws or by decisions interpreting them.” Id. Hence it was 
necessary for the Court to recite the established law of Section 1 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  
9. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 
164 (2011) (“Following the collapse of slavery, southern states attempted to reinstitute 
chattel slavery by another name through the Black Codes and through a campaign of ter-
ror against the freedmen and their white allies. The Fourteenth Amendment sought to 
outlaw these practices and promised equal citizenship.”); see also Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 588–89 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ignatius Donnelly) (describing legisla-
tion passed by various Southern states that reestablished conditions akin to slavery); id. at 
474 (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull) (noting Southern legislatures “still imposed 
upon [the freedmen] . . . the very restrictions which were imposed upon them in conse-
quence of the existence of slavery, and before it was abolished”). 
10. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (quoting Butler, 240 U.S. at 332). 
11. Well, not quite a parody since one of the most famous originalist scholars argued 
something very much like this. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The 
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 20–23, 29–31, 44, 117–33 (1977) (arguing 
that Fourteenth Amendment was designed to overturn Black Codes by guaranteeing basic 
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Thirteenth Amendment were taken as seriously as the Fourteenth has 
been taken, one would expect considerable political and legal efforts to 
make sense of its underlying purposes and apply its terms (and purposes) 
to new situations. Just as the Establishment Clause has been read to ban 
more than state-sponsored churches or government-salaried ministers, 
and the Free Speech Clause to protect all manner of expression, one 
would have asked how best to make sense of the terms “slavery” and “in-
voluntary servitude” in a modern world. But, as United States v. Kozminski 
demonstrates, precisely the opposite has occurred. In the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, at least, the more limited the meaning of these 
terms, the better. 
Part I of this Essay describes the multiple and overlapping reasons 
why the Thirteenth Amendment has been read far more narrowly than 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Part II explains why 
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment in the same way contemporary 
interpreters read the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of Rights is 
“dangerous.” The demand that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
. . . shall exist within the United States,” taken seriously, potentially calls 
into question too many different aspects of public and private power, 
ranging from political governance to market practices to the family itself. 
Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on “slavery” is the flip side of 
Article IV Section 4’s guarantee of “republican government,”12 another 
clause with enormous potential reach that has effectively been read out 
of the Constitution (and, not coincidentally, out of the standard canon 
of constitutional subjects taught at America’s law schools13). 
Part III explains that our contemporary association of “slavery” with 
a very limited set of historical practices is anachronistic and the result of 
a long historical process. The language of the Thirteenth Amendment is 
taken from the 1787 Northwest Ordinance.14 Yet at the time of the 
founding, the concept of “slavery” was far broader than currently under-
stood. “Chattel slavery” was only the most extreme and visible example of 
“slavery,” which meant illegitimate domination, political subordination, 
and the absence of republican government. American colonists repeat-
edly argued that the British Empire had made them slaves because they 
                                                                                                                 
common law civil rights protected by Civil Rights Act of 1866, and little more, and should 
be so interpreted today); Raoul Berger, Selected Writings on the Constitution 185 (1987) 
(“[T]he uncontroverted evidence, confirmed in these pages, is that the framers [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] repeatedly stated that the amendment and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 were ‘identical’ . . . .”). 
12. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
13. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. 963, 975 (1998) (describing “pedagogical canon” of key cases and materials 
taught in law schools).  
14. See infra notes 80–93 and accompanying text (discussing provenance of 
Thirteenth Amendment).  
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lacked political freedoms and political representation in Parliament.15 
This eighteenth-century view opposing slavery to republicanism survives 
in Cold War arguments equating communism and totalitarianism to 
slavery and in twenty-first-century Tea Party rhetoric attacking big gov-
ernment. 
Part IV describes how the broader, antirepublican concept of slavery 
was narrowed during the fight for abolition for political and strategic 
reasons. Southern defenders of slavery taunted abolitionists by arguing 
that wage workers in the North and in England were equally slaves, and 
early suffragists argued that women were also unjustly subordinated. 
These critiques gave abolitionists incentives to maintain a sharp divide 
between chattel slavery and other forms of economic subordination, as 
well as the treatment of women. Once chattel slavery was abolished, labor 
activists and suffragists sought to return to the older, broader under-
standing of “slavery.” But emancipation allowed defenders of the status 
quo to insist that American society was now “free.” Normal, everyday 
aspects of economic and family life could not be “slavery,” which was by 
definition the worst of evils and had already been eradicated by law. 
Today, calling an injustice “slavery” is generally seen as overheated 
hyperbole and even a presumptuous insult to the memory of the victims 
of African American chattel slavery. This Essay concludes by asking how 
our political imagination has been limited as a result of this history. 
I. THE JURISPATHIC TREATMENT OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The legal historian Robert Cover famously called processes that 
produce multiple legal doctrines and interpretations “jurisgenerative,” 
and processes that cut off lines of development “jurispathic.”16 The 
Fourteenth Amendment is one of the most jurisgenerative parts of the 
Constitution. Yet there is little doubt that the history of the Thirteenth 
Amendment (and its twin, the Guarantee Clause) has been decidedly 
jurispathic. 
Why has the Thirteenth Amendment been treated so differently 
from the Fourteenth? There are many overlapping reasons. Part of the 
explanation lies in the history of Reconstruction and its subsequent 
disparagement as the price of political reunion by Northern and 
Southern whites.17 Moreover, precisely because the Thirteenth 
                                                 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 117–121. 
16. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 11, 40 (1983). 
17. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), which limited the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, also read the Thirteenth 
Amendment narrowly. The “obvious purpose” of the Amendment, Justice Miller ex-
plained, “was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery,” id. at 69, and any new 
form of slavery that might arise similar to that suffered by blacks: 
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Amendment did not seem to resolve the problems of post-war injustice 
and violence in the South, the Reconstruction Congress went on to ratify 
a Fourteenth Amendment.18 This amendment not only largely displaced 
the Thirteenth in the public imagination, but also became an almost ob-
sessive focus of attention for the Court and lawyers alike.19  
But why did this occur? One of the most likely reasons is that the 
Fourteenth Amendment proved unexpectedly useful to a large number 
of powerful interests in post-Civil War America. Corporations and busi-
nesses were able to procure interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that served their purposes during the late nineteenth cen-
tury and thereafter.20 They could make little use of the Thirteenth 
Amendment or the Fifteenth Amendment, which seemed to focus more 
clearly on the interests of the former slaves. 
In fact, the Thirteenth Amendment was particularly unhelpful to cor-
porate interests. First, the Amendment might be the source of 
congressional power to pass laws designed to protect employees from 
overreaching employers.21 Second, if corporations were persons under 
the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, much of the law governing 
for-profit corporations would probably be unconstitutional. In particular, 
                                                                                                                 
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which 
proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or 
hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop 
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment 
may safely be trusted to make it void. 
Id. at 72. Justice Miller’s opinion rejected the plaintiff butchers’ broader argument that 
the New Orleans ordinance, by forcing butchers to work for a monopoly controlled by a 
small group of favored businessmen, was akin to feudal servitude. See also infra note 155 
(discussing Thirteenth Amendment arguments of plaintiffs in Slaughter-House Cases).  
18. See Joint Comm. on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., Report of the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction, at xiii–xiv (1866) (explaining why new amendment was necessary to 
protect freed men and women); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 Yale L.J. 1353, 1354–58 (1964) (explain-
ing Reconstruction Congress believed it needed new tools to deal with discrimination and 
violence in Southern states). 
19. It is also possible that the Fourteenth Amendment limited the legal reach of the 
Thirteenth Amendment because it was ratified later in time. See Mark Graber, Subtraction 
by Addition?: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1501, 
1506 (2012) (“[T]he proper inference may be that the Fourteenth Amendment repealed 
or modified crucial rights originally protected by the Thirteenth Amendment.”). But the 
bare texts of the two Amendments, considered by themselves, do not lead to this 
conclusion. If this occurred, it must be for other reasons. 
20. See Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886) (treating corpora-
tions as persons for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment).  
21. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: 
Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 
18 (2002) (“Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied only to state action, the 
Thirteenth made no distinction between governmental and private conduct, and thus 
could support legislation banning employers as well as government from interfering with 
labor rights.”). 
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it would be unconstitutional to buy or sell (for-profit) corporations, 
auction them off in public markets (sometimes called stock exchanges), 
or liquidate them in the interests of profit.22 
 Ironically, even the most determined opponents of slavery may have 
contributed to the Amendment’s neglect. In Amy Dru Stanley’s 
important book From Bondage to Contract, she points out that even such 
notable and courageous abolitionists as William Lloyd Garrison believed 
their work was largely over once chattel slavery was abolished: “Where are 
the slave auction-blocks,” Garrison exclaimed, “the slave-yokes and 
fetters. . . . They are all gone! From chattels to human beings. . . . 
Freedmen at work as independent laborers by voluntary contract!”23 
 In Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy, historian Eric 
Foner notes that all societies that have ended slavery have struggled over 
the meaning of the freedom that emancipation brings.24 The title of his 
book is taken from the comment, by Confederate General Robert V. 
Richardson, that “[t]he emancipated slaves own nothing, because noth-
ing but freedom has been given to them.”25 This was not merely the view 
of ex-rebels. Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York Tribune, fancied 
himself an avid opponent of slavery.26 Yet Greeley dismissed calls for giv-
ing the freed men “forty acres and a mule” because it would have re-
quired the confiscation of slaveholders’ land and redistribution to for-
mer slaves.27 This, he argued, was “either knavery or madness. . . . People 
                                                 
22. See Jack M. Balkin, Corporations and the Thirteenth Amendment, Balkinization 
(Jan. 28, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/corporations-and-
thirteenth-amendment.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[F]or-profit corpora-
tions are by nature designed to be ‘slaves’ [of their owners]. That is what distinguishes 
them from natural persons.”); Jack M. Balkin, More on Corporations as Slaves, 
Balkinization (Jan. 29, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/more-on-
corporations-as-slaves.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Like slavemasters, [the 
owners of a for-profit corporation] . . . have the power of life or death over their corpora-
tions. On the other hand, the owners can sue other people who attempt to injure the cor-
poration, and . . . take various steps to avoid hostile takeovers.”).  
23. Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the 
Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation 4 (1998). Garrison was far more sympathetic to 
the plight of exploited workers in a “free labor” system than this quote suggests. His point, 
rather, was to emphasize the importance of being able to own and sell one’s own labor. 
24. Eric Foner, Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and Its Legacy 1 (1983) 
(“Whether accomplished by black revolution, legislation, or civil war, emancipation . . . 
raised intractable questions about the system of economic organization and social rela-
tions that would replace slavery.”). 
25. Id. at 55. 
26. Greeley had, of course, penned a famous letter in the Tribune to Abraham 
Lincoln in August of 1862 pressing Lincoln for a quicker path to emancipation. Lincoln’s 
equally famous reply was that his goal was to save the Union, whether with slavery or with-
out it. But by September, Lincoln had announced plans for an Emancipation 
Proclamation to take effect on January 1, 1863. Robert C. Williams, Horace Greeley: 
Champion of American Freedom 233–34 (2006). 
27. Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 
431 (5th ed. 2006). 
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who want farms work for them. The only class we know that takes other 
people’s property because they want it is largely represented in Sing 
Sing.”28 Southern blacks were relegated to the market with no resources 
besides their own labor, which white employers sought to control and 
exploit through labor contracts. 
As Stanley notes, one of the recurrent debates within the tradition of 
“social contract” theory is whether freedom of contract gives individuals 
the right to make binding contracts that would effectively make them 
slaves and forfeit their liberty.29 Although most theorists did indeed place 
a limit on what people could contract to, some did not; for the latter, 
contracts for slavery were no different from any other presumptively 
arm’s-length transaction between consenting adults.30 Versions of this 
tension sometimes appear in modern-day contracts courses. The 
principle of freedom of contract—and the concomitant rejection of 
principles of unconscionability and duress—when taken to an extreme, 
undermines confidence in an unregulated market’s ability to deliver 
genuine freedom for all. That is especially so in a society with vast 
disparities of income, wealth, and bargaining power. Once the direct 
ownership of human beings is abolished, this is the question raised—and 
the danger posed—by the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Pete Daniel, for example, notes how freedom of contract gradually 
developed into a system of peonage that ensnared Southern blacks after 
the Civil War: 
Lacking land or capital of their own, blacks had little choice but 
to sign yearly contracts. . . . As military control became less strict 
in the South, a labor pattern emerged. Most blacks signed 
annual contracts. Improvident, they took advances on their ex-
pected share of the crop. When settlement time came the next 
fall, the laborers often discovered that their share of the crop 
did not cover what they owed the supply merchant or the 
planter. . . . [S]ome planters demanded that workers remain 
until they had worked out their entire debt, and when planters 
used indebtedness as an instrument of compulsion, the system 
became peonage.31 
Foner and Daniel both indicate that peonage depended on the for-
mal mechanism of contract, supplemented by the use of the criminal law 
to punish its breach. In the peonage cases at the turn of the twentieth 
                                                 
28. Id.  
29. See Stanley, supra note 23, at 6 (“Whether free persons could contract away all 
their rights and therefore voluntarily become slaves was a point of theoretical dispute.”). 
30. Id. (comparing Hobbes and Pufendorf, both of whom recognized legitimacy of 
contracts for slavery, with Locke, who did not). 
31. Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901–1969, at 19–20 
(1972); see also Pete Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865–1900, 66 J. Am. Hist. 88, 
89 (1979) (“[P]eonage was widespread in the South by the turn of the century . . . . 
[S]lavery had indeed ended for some blacks, but for others it had endured, metamor-
phosed.”). 
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century, the Thirteenth Amendment briefly made a reappearance to 
limit some of these developments, but doctrinal expansion did not go 
very far.32 In Bailey v. Alabama, which invalidated the most onerous form 
of that state’s peonage system, the Court nevertheless insisted that it 
made no difference that “the plaintiff in error is a black man. . . . The 
statute, on its face, makes no racial discrimination, and the record fails to 
show its existence in fact. . . . [W]e may view the legislation in the same 
manner as if it had been enacted in New York or in Idaho.”33 Yet the 
development of the ideas of human freedom in the peonage cases was 
quite modest in comparison to the luxuriant flowering of other freedom 
of contract doctrines developed during the same period through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34  
It is also possible that connections between the use of judicial review 
in the peonage cases and Lochner-style jurisprudence created complica-
tions for progressive jurists. It is worth noting that Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., whose Lochner dissent argued that the Fourteenth 
                                                 
32. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219 (1911). 
33. 219 U.S. at 231. 
34. In two other cases, the Court was decidedly unsympathetic to Thirteenth 
Amendment claims that government practices were “involuntary servitude.” Butler v. Perry 
involved a Florida law that required males between twenty-one and forty-five to work for 
six ten-hour days on roads and bridges each year. 240 U.S. 328, 329 (1916). They could 
avoid this task by providing an able-bodied substitute (evoking memories of the notorious 
system of conscription during the Civil War), or by paying three dollars in lieu of a day’s 
labor to the county road and bridge fund. Id. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
McReynolds explained that the Thirteenth Amendment was not designed to end the an-
cient tradition of requiring residents to provide labor for road upkeep: “The great pur-
pose in view was liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction 
of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.” Id. at 333. 
A year later, the Court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to the Selective 
Draft Act of 1917, arguing that military service was a public duty. The Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). Chief Justice White stated,  
[W]e are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government 
from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contrib-
uting to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation . . . can be said to be 
the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
The issue is still alive today in calls for enhancing Americans’ sense of common 
commitment and duty through a compulsory service program (whether military or chari-
table) for American youth. Many people on the left and the right support such programs. 
Some argue that without compulsory service, for example, America will get into too many 
wars, and Americans will lose a sense of public duty. 
Contemporary constitutional doctrine recognizes that “compelling state interests” can 
override otherwise clear constitutional prohibitions. Does this mean that, under suffi-
ciently compelling circumstances, the Constitution allows slavery (in cases other than 
criminal punishment)? Or is the Thirteenth Amendment different from the Fourteenth in 
this respect—it protects far less, but what it does protect, it protects absolutely? 
1468 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 112:1459 
 
Amendment did not bar “tyrannical” legislation as such,35 also dissented 
in Bailey v. Alabama. Alabama had created a legal presumption that any-
one who ceased work after signing a contract for long-term employment 
and accepting an advance of wages had intended to defraud the em-
ployer and could be criminally punished for doing so, even though the 
accused was not permitted to testify to rebut the statutory presumption.36 
In Holmes’s view, such a law was simply a means of ensuring that con-
tracts were enforced by creating proper incentives.37 As such, Holmes 
believed that Alabama’s law was as much within the legislature’s power as 
New York’s decision to limit the maximum hours of bakers. “Peonage,” 
Holmes explained, “is service to a private master at which a man is kept 
by bodily compulsion against his will. But the creation of the ordinary 
legal motives for right conduct does not produce it.”38 
To be sure, after emancipation, some activists made connections be-
tween the ban on slavery and the constitutional claims of the populists 
and the labor movement,39 and still later on, the constitutional claims of 
the twentieth century movement for black civil rights.40 However, it was 
the legal equivalent of swimming upstream against a vigorous current. 
Risa Goluboff has shown how Thirteenth Amendment claims were 
offered on behalf of black sharecroppers in the middle of the twentieth 
century, but these theories were eventually abandoned.41 The NAACP’s 
legal strategy focused instead on undermining the logic of Plessy v. 
Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine by bringing cases aimed at segre-
gation in colleges and professional schools; it naturally focused on the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 In this strategy, the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the constitutional demand of freedom from 
oppressive working conditions did not fit particularly well.43 
                                                 
35. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is set-
tled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate 
life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyran-
nical as this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract.”). 
36. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228. 
37. Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 155–162 (describing examples of arguments 
by labor activists following Civil War). 
40. This history is described in Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 
(2007). 
41. Id. at 10–13, 217–18, 256–57, 259. 
42. See Robert L. Carter, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 
86 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1084–85 (1988) (reviewing Mark Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal 
Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (1987)) (explaining that NAACP’s 
strategy under Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall was to focus on desegregating 
graduate and professional schools, followed by public schools). 
43. See Goluboff, supra note 40, at 217, 228 (“Once [Thurgood] Marshall fixed his 
sights on Plessy, the labor cases that had once held out legal as well as institutional promise 
fell by the doctrinal wayside.”). 
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Later social movements, building on the NAACP’s example—and 
the equal protection jurisprudence spawned by Brown v. Board of 
Education44—continued to focus on the Fourteenth Amendment rather 
than the Thirteenth.45 In what might be a self-fulfilling prophecy, succes-
sive waves of social movements have gravitated to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even though in theory they could also have used the con-
cepts of nondomination and self-sufficiency implicit in the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s prohibition against slavery. 
Even so, it is not surprising that interest in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and in particular the Enforcement Clause of Section 2, 
would make somewhat of a comeback during the civil rights revolution, 
when all three branches of the federal government got behind the 
movement for black civil rights. In a trio of cases, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co.,46 Griffin v. Breckenridge,47 and Runyon v. McCrary,48 the Warren and 
early Burger Courts held that Congress had extensive powers to reach 
racial discrimination (and later discrimination based on national origin 
and ancestry49) under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. What the 
Supreme Court did not do, however, was offer much discussion of the 
substantive meaning of Section 1. Rather, it broadly read Congress’s 
powers to remedy the “badges and incidents of slavery,”50 a phrase taken 
from the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, which had construed Congress’s powers 
far more narrowly. 
                                                 
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
45. Major victories in the courts by social movements for the rights of women, gays, 
and noncitizens reflect this focus on the model of Brown and the Fourteenth Amendment 
rather than the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 
(2003) (protecting gay rights under Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (protecting gay rights under Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982) (holding 
that children of undocumented aliens are protected by Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires heightened scrutiny of sex classifications); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (upholding abortion rights under Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (holding that 
preference for male over female administrators of estates violated Equal Protection Clause 
of Fourteenth Amendment); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding 
state statute denying welfare benefits to resident aliens violates Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause). 
46. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
47. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 
48. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
49. See Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987) (holding 
that Congress’s remedial powers under Thirteenth Amendment allow it to ban discrimina-
tion against Jews, who were considered “race” at time of Thirteenth Amendment’s enact-
ment); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 to persons of Arab ancestry); cf. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 190–91 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (holding that Section 2 gives Congress power to reach some religious discrimi-
nation in order to eliminate badges and incidents of slavery). 
50. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
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II. A “DANGEROUS” AMENDMENT 
Perhaps the most basic reason for the Thirteenth Amendment’s ne-
glect, however, is that far from being useless to interest groups and social 
mobilizations, it is altogether too useful—it is so potentially far-reaching 
that it might justify a truly radical transformation of the American social 
and political order. If ending “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” means 
embarking on the project of ending domination in social life, and secur-
ing self-rule and self-sufficiency, then the imperative is too capacious. 
The Amendment puts too many features of society into question, ranging 
from the way that markets and government actually work to the way that 
family life is structured. Once chattel slavery is eliminated, the logical 
next step is to question what other forms of unjust exploitation and 
compulsion might exist in society and how best to eliminate them.  
That question becomes disturbing precisely because so many other 
social arrangements are normally justified on the basis of freedom, con-
sent, and social convention; therefore, it is generally assumed, the every-
day experience of family, market, and state is the very opposite of 
unfreedom and slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment has been limited 
precisely because the idea of eliminating “slavery” or “involuntary 
servitude,” taken seriously, promises far too much emancipatory 
potential for comfort, at least for those who benefit from the status quo 
and the ideologies that justify it.  
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment is taken from the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787.51 But the idea of “slavery” at the founding 
was far broader than the chattel slavery that was the primary object of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. To the Founders, slavery was the very 
opposite of republican government. American revolutionaries argued 
that British tyranny and the unrepresentativeness of British institutions 
had reduced them to slaves.52 
So understood, the Thirteenth Amendment ban on slavery is the 
mirror image of another much neglected clause: the Guarantee Clause of 
Article IV, Section 4, under which the United States endeavors to guaran-
tee the states “a Republican form of Government.”53 If the Thirteenth 
Amendment has been read narrowly, the Guarantee Clause has virtually 
been read out of existence as raising only political questions 
inappropriate for judicial resolution,54 while the implicit federal power to 
                                                 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 80–93 (discussing debates over Thirteenth 
Amendment’s language). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 103–107 (describing how concept of “slavery” 
was invoked by colonists protesting British rule). 
53. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
54. See Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42, 46–47 (1849) (“For as the United 
States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide 
what government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is republi-
can or not.”); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223–29 (1962) (reaffirming that 
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secure republican government has, for the most part, lain unused.55 Both 
clauses have been limited because both are “dangerous”: Their potential 
reach seems unlimited and, taken to their logical conclusions, they might 
require a serious rethinking of public and private power in the United 
States. 
Sanford Levinson has recently published a book emphasizing the 
difference between the “Constitution of Conversation,” which consists of 
those clauses actively litigated and subjected to endless discussion in the 
legal academy, and the “Constitution of Settlement,” referring to a vari-
ety of textual provisions that establish our basic political structures and 
that are never litigated because their meanings are deemed “self-evident” 
as a practical matter.56 There is a third possibility, though: the 
“Constitution of Silence,” consisting of those clauses of the Constitution 
that could be remarkably important, but which contemporary lawyers, 
judges, and scholars have, for one reason or another, chosen to ignore. 
The Thirteenth Amendment is perhaps the best example of the 
Constitution of Silence, along with such other provisions as the 
Guarantee Clause,57 the Titles of Nobility Clause,58 and the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.59 The point is not that these clauses are irrelevant to 
modern life; rather, the point is that, taken seriously, they might be alto-
gether too relevant. 
                                                                                                                 
Guarantee Clause is nonjusticiable while holding that courts may review state legislative 
reapportionment schemes under Equal Protection Clause); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 148 (1912) (“The fundamental doctrines thus so lucidly and co-
gently announced by the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the case 
which we have thus reviewed, have never been doubted or questioned since . . . .”); Taylor 
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578 (1900) (“It was long ago settled [by Luther v. Borden] that 
the enforcement of this guarantee belonged to the political department.”). Although 
Luther has come to stand for the general proposition that the Guarantee Clause is nonjus-
ticiable, it could—and should—be read far more narrowly. See Jack M. Balkin, Living 
Originalism 241–42 (2011) [hereinafter Balkin, Living Originalism] (“[Luther v. Borden] 
holds only that some kinds of claims—those involving recognition of governments and 
deciding when domestic violence requires intervention by federal troops—are best deter-
mined by the political branches . . . .”). 
55. Senator Charles Sumner once called the Guarantee Clause “a sleeping giant in 
the Constitution,” because “[t]here is no clause which gives to Congress such supreme 
power over the States . . . .” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of 
Sen. Charles Sumner). It is precisely for that reason, William Wiecek has argued, that the 
Clause has largely been left undisturbed since Reconstruction. William M. Wiecek, The 
Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 295 (1971). 
56. See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s Fifty-One Constitutions and the Crisis 
of Governance 17–27 (2012) (explaining distinction between mostly textual “Constitution 
of Settlement” and “Constitution of Conversation,” which concerns indeterminate aspects 
of Constitution). Examples of provisions in the Constitution of Settlement are the length 
of the president’s term, the timing of inauguration day, and the allocation of two senators 
to each state regardless of population.  
57. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4. 
58. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
59. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
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But precisely why is the concept of slavery in the Thirteenth 
Amendment so dangerous? There are several different overlapping rea-
sons. First, the focus of the Thirteenth Amendment seems to be society as 
a whole, not merely state power. All of the Justices in the Civil Rights Cases 
noted that the Thirteenth Amendment contained no state action re-
quirement;60 for the majority, this was a reason to restrict its power and 
scope. As Justice Bradley (in)famously explained, “It would be running 
the slavery argument into the ground” to allow Congress to prohibit ra-
cial discrimination in places of public accommodation.61 
Bradley’s metaphor suggests that calling these forms of race discrim-
ination unjust domination would discredit the principle of eliminating 
the badges and incidents of slavery. But the reason it would discredit the 
principle is that it would discomfit too many whites. By 1883, many 
whites, in both the North and the South, had accepted the Compromise 
of 1877 that had ended Reconstruction and returned political power to 
white elites in the South.62 Desiring sectional peace, Northern white 
majorities either acquiesced to—or actively supported—the unfettered 
return to power of white majorities in the South who were committed to 
white privilege and black inferiority.63 Moreover, as Michael Les Benedict 
has observed, other factors drove the Compromise of 1877 as well. 
Northern white elites increasingly feared what they perceived as the 
threat of “socialism”—demands by freed blacks and their white sympa-
thizers for redistributive programs.64 Elites feared that newly empowered 
majorities would be led astray by “[w]eak-minded sentimentalists or cor-
                                                 
60. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (“Under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the legislation . . . may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of 
individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not; under the Fourteenth . . . it 
must necessarily be . . . corrective in its character, addressed to counteract and afford re-
lief against state regulations or proceedings.”); id. at 35–36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nder the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has to do with slavery and its incidents; 
and that legislation . . . may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, 
whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”). 
61. Id. at 24–25 (majority opinion) (“It would be running the slavery argument into 
the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or 
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse 
or business.”).  
62. See generally David Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American 
Memory 137–38 (2001) (describing terms of Compromise of 1877).  
63. See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 67 (1955) (“[T]he liber-
als . . . felt themselves strongly drawn toward the cause of sectional reconciliation. And 
since the Negro was the symbol of sectional strife, the liberals joined in deprecating fur-
ther agitation of his cause and in defending the Southern view of race in its less extreme 
forms.”). 
64. See Michael Les Benedict, Reform Republicans and the Retreat from 
Reconstruction, in Preserving the Constitution: Essays on Politics and the Constitution in 
the Reconstruction Era 168, 168–72 (2006) (noting Northern reformers viewed redistribu-
tive policies as threat to human liberty and equal rights). 
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rupt demagogues” who would stir up discontent among the masses.65 
Benedict tellingly quotes a now-forgotten reformer, Abram S. Hewitt, 
who wrote that “[t]he problem . . . is, to make men who are equal . . . in 
political rights and . . . entitled to the [formal right of] ownership of 
property[] content with that inequality in its distribution which must in-
evitably result from the application of the law of justice.”66 
Notions of blacks’ appropriate place in the social and economic hi-
erarchies were embedded in social life and social practices in different 
parts of the country, but especially in the former Confederacy; these no-
tions were defended either as the natural order of things or as necessary 
compromises to maintain social peace in the face of white objections. 
Constitutional law was enlisted to preserve these prerogatives. The most 
famous example, of course, is Justice Brown’s opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, which asserted that if blacks objected to segregated railway car-
riages, it must be because they were hypersensitive.67  
In his private notes, Justice Bradley went further. Not only would in-
tegrated facilities be “running the slavery argument into the ground,”68 
but such a requirement would also impose “slavery” on white people.69 
“Surely,” Bradley wrote, “Congress cannot guaranty to the colored people 
admission to every place of gathering and amusement. To deprive white 
people of the right of choosing their own company would be to intro-
duce another kind of slavery.”70 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 “has already 
                                                 
65. Id. at 172. 
66. Id. (quoting Abram S. Hewitt, The Mutual Relations of Capital and Labor: 
Speech at the Church Congress, Cincinnati (Oct. 18, 1878), in Selected Writings of Abram 
S. Hewitt 277, 277 (Allan Nevins ed., 1937)). Compare this with the thundering pro-
nouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Coppage v. Kansas, which invalidated a 
Kansas law that prevented employers from requiring their employees to sign “yellow dog” 
contracts under which employees promised not to join labor unions:  
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be 
inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating 
about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This applies to 
all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and employé. Indeed, a 
little reflection will show that wherever the right of private property and the 
right of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more 
or less influenced by the question whether he has much property, or little, or 
none; for the contract is made to the very end that each may gain something 
that he needs or desires more urgently than that which he proposes to give in 
exchange. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in com-
mon, some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature 
of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private 
property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities 
of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights. 
236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). 
67. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
68. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
69. 7 Charles Fairman, The History of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888, pt. 2, at 564 (1987). 
70. Id. 
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guarantied to the blacks the right of buying, selling and holding prop-
erty, and of equal protection of the laws. Are not these the essentials of 
freedom? Surely a white lady cannot be enforced by Congressional en-
actment to admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner 
party.”71 To be sure, “[t]he [Thirteenth A]mendment declares that slav-
ery and involuntary servitude shall be abolished, and that Congress may 
enforce the enfranchisement of the slaves. Granted: but does freedom of 
the blacks require the slavery of the whites? [A]nd enforced fellowship 
would be that.”72 
This gives Bradley’s famous metaphor an unexpected meaning: 
“running the slavery argument into the ground,” would, like a plow, un-
earth or dig up features of social life that many whites wanted to main-
tain unquestioned and unchallenged. Unearthing these aspects of social 
life was dangerous precisely because it would undermine a basic com-
promise underlying the Reconstruction Amendments. Blacks were enti-
tled to civil equality, such as the right to make contracts and own prop-
erty, but not social equality—that is, the right to associate with whites as 
equals.73 Even if blacks were equals in the abstract, whites should remain 
their superiors in civil society.74 Hence Bradley’s horror at the thought 
that white women would have to mix with blacks, and his conflation of 
places of public accommodation with private dances and dinner parties. 
                                                 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. On the distinction between civil and social equality, see, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (1872) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull) (stating Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 was “confined exclusively to civil rights and nothing else, no political and no social 
rights”); Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 54, at 222–26 (explaining Reconstruction 
Era distinctions between civil, political, and social equality); Harold M. Hyman & William 
W. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional Development, 1835–1875, at 277–78, 
394–402 (1982) (explaining that whereas civil rights were “those rights essential to differ-
entiate a slave from a free person,” “the highest and most controversial stratum” of rights 
concerned “social equality,” which, in the view of most whites, included equal access to 
public accommodations); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1024 (1995) (“It was generally understood that the nondis-
crimination requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to ‘civil rights.’ 
Political and social rights, it was agreed, were not civil rights and were not protected.”); 
Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1207, 1208 (1992) (“For Reconstruction legal thinkers 
civil, political and social rights were seen as three distinct categories. Civil rights attached 
to people simply because they were people . . . . Social rights were exercised in the rest of 
the social order . . . . [G]overnment had nothing to do with guaranteeing social 
rights . . . .”). 
74. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (“The object of the amendment 
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but . . . it 
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce so-
cial, as distinguished from political equality . . . .”); id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing superiority of white race socially “in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth 
and in power” but arguing that “[i]n respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the 
law”). 
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Social inequality was justified as a feature of personal privacy—an inevi-
table consequence of private preferences and human nature—and was 
defended both in law and in constitutional doctrine. To dig up and ex-
pose these aspects of social life to criticism made the slavery argument—
and the Thirteenth Amendment itself—far too dangerous.75 
This leads to a second reason why the Thirteenth Amendment is so 
dangerous. The idea of slavery, focusing as it does on nondomination 
and self-sufficiency, can apply to many different societies, including 
modern ones. Nineteenth-century critics called slavery a form of barba-
rism (sometimes coupling it with polygamy), implying that slavery was a 
feature of premodern or ancient societies.76 But domination and en-
forced social dependency do not disappear in modern societies. They 
merely reappear in new guises, sometimes through public power, some-
times through private power, and sometimes through a combination of 
both. One does not have to be a Marxist to recognize that unregulated 
capitalism might create its own forms of domination and oppression to 
replace the chattel slavery of older societies. Nor does one have to be a 
Hayekian to recognize that unchecked and unaccountable government 
power can reduce citizens to new forms of servitude. If domination can 
exist within markets and welfare states alike, and can be reproduced even 
in social systems that promise formal equality, then domination will ap-
pear—and reappear constantly—in modern societies. 
Furthermore, eliminating pervasive and overlapping forms of domi-
nation might call for remedies that give people self-sufficiency, like the 
famous redistributive formula of “forty acres and a mule” for the former 
slaves that sent Horace Greeley into livid fury.77 If so, then once again it 
might undermine market capitalism, making the attack on slavery as 
dangerous to market-based liberalism as it is to traditional status hierar-
chies. 
Third, once it is acknowledged that “slavery” need not be identical 
to or closely resemble African chattel slavery, the attack on slavery might 
threaten not only modern capitalism and the modern state, but also any 
number of traditional social formations and traditional status relations. 
                                                 
75. Or, as contemporary opponents of the individual mandate might put it, the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantees have “no limiting principle.” 
76. The 1856 platform of the new Republican Party, for example, insisted on “both 
the right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin 
relics of barbarism—Polygamy, and Slavery.” Republican Platform of 1856, in 1 National 
Party Platforms, 1840–1956, at 27 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., Univ. of Ill. Press rev. ed. 
1978) (1924). 
77. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal 
Entitlements, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 37, 37 (1990) (“[A] minimal entitlement to prop-
erty is so important, so constitutive, and so essential for both individual and collective self-
governance that to provide each citizen with that minimal amount of property, the gov-
ernment may legitimately redistribute property from other citizens who have far more 
than their minimal share.”). 
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These include traditional family structure, relationships of power and 
authority between the sexes, and relationships between parents and chil-
dren.78 Insisting that “slavery” shall not exist anywhere in a nation does 
more than end the practice of owning human beings. Once lawyers read 
the prohibition on “slavery” as broadly as they read parts of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
command to abolish slavery puts many different aspects of society into 
question. 
Fourth, both the Thirteenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause 
offer Congress the power to enforce them—explicitly in the case of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and implicitly in the case of the Guarantee 
Clause. (After all, if the Constitution requires that United States guaran-
tee republican government, it must have adequate powers to make that 
guarantee good in practice.) Yet enforcing these provisions consistent 
with the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland79—which offers a generous 
                                                 
78. See Susan B. Anthony, Is It a Crime for a United States Citizen To Vote? (1872–
1873), in 2 History of Woman Suffrage, 1861–1876, at 630–47 (Arno & The New York 
Times 1969) (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1882) (arguing that because women had 
been subject to restrictions of coverture, denied rights of political participation, and pre-
vented from pursuing their own ambitions in life, they had effectively been held in slavery 
by their fathers, brothers, and husbands); Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 
Const. Comment. 403, 404–05 (1993) (“You might think that . . . slavery is about oppres-
sion of the Other and not about family. . . . [But] biology is in no way inconsistent with 
oppression.”); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: 
A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1364 (1992) 
(“Under ordinary circumstances, parental custody does not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment . . . . But when a parent perverts this coercive authority by systematically abus-
ing and degrading his ward[,] . . . the parent violates the Thirteenth Amendment and 
should be subject to suit.”). 
The condition of slavery is normally thought to concern treating human beings like 
animals, but some animal rights activists have sought to extend the idea even to relations 
between humans and animals. Consider a lawsuit recently filed against SeaWorld parks in 
San Diego and Orlando for their confinement of five orca whales. See David Crary & Julie 
Watson, PETA Lawsuit Seeks To Expand Animal Rights, Yahoo! News (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://news.yahoo.com/peta-lawsuit-seeks-expand-animal-rights-222219887.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (“People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA] is 
accusing the SeaWorld parks of keeping five star-performer whales in conditions that vio-
late the 13th Amendment ban on slavery.”). According to the lawyer for PETA, “By any 
definition, these orcas are slaves—kidnapped from their homes, kept confined, denied 
everything that’s natural to them and forced to perform tricks for SeaWorld’s profit.” Id. 
Moreover, “[t]he males have their sperm collected, the females are artificially inseminated 
and forced to bear young which are sometimes shipped away.” Id. Not surprisingly, 
SeaWorld sees things quite differently, calling the use of the Thirteenth Amendment 
“baseless and in many ways offensive.” Id. In addition to the differences between keeping 
whales and human beings in captivity, the company explained that its treatment of the 
whales could not be like slavery because “SeaWorld is among the world’s most respected 
zoological institutions . . . . There is no higher priority than the welfare of the animals 
entrusted to our care and no facility sets higher standards in husbandry, veterinary care 
and enrichment.” Id.  
79. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
2012] DANGEROUS THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 1477 
 
interpretation of Congress’s powers—would give the federal government 
broad new powers to attempt to reshape both law and society. 
The connections between slavery and republicanism—with its triple 
focus on nondomination, self-sufficiency, and the accountability of 
power—and the potentially (and dangerously) broad scope of the con-
cept of slavery have always proved too much for American judges and 
politicians to stomach. As a result, both the Thirteenth Amendment and 
the Guarantee Clause have been cabined and limited throughout the 
country’s history—so that they do not require too much of either public 
or private institutions. It is well worth asking what is gained and what is 
lost by this jurispathic treatment. 
III. THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The language of Section 1 is taken from Article 6 of the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787: “There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . .”80 Congress had 
used similar language in two 1862 acts, ending slavery first in the District 
of Columbia and then in all federal territories.81 Senator Charles 
Sumner’s proposal, borrowing language from the French Declaration of 
Rights of 1791, would have provided, “All persons are equal before the 
law, so that no person can hold another as a slave; and the Congress may 
make all laws necessary and proper to carry this article into effect 
everywhere within the United States and the jurisdiction thereof.”82 But 
this language was quickly rejected by the Senate. Senator Jacob Howard 
objected that the equality formula was “utterly insignificant and mean-
ingless,”83 adding nothing to the abolition of slavery.  
One might think that the decision to reject Sumner’s language 
should be quite significant: It would mean that the Thirteenth 
Amendment merely ends slavery but does not secure equality of any 
kind. But this does not appear to be what congressional Republicans ac-
tually believed. In the brief congressional debates over the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and later again in the much longer debates over the 1866 
Civil Rights Act, Senators Lyman Trumbull (the author of the Thirteenth 
                                                 
80. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. VI, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a). 
81. An Act to Secure Freedom to All Persons Within the Territories of the United 
States, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432, 432 (1862) (declaring “there shall be neither slavery nor in-
voluntary servitude” in territories); An Act for the Release of Certain Persons Held to 
Service or Labor in the District of Columbia, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376, 376 (1862) (proclaiming 
“neither slavery nor involuntary servitude” shall exist in District of Columbia). Similar 
language was also used in the Missouri Compromise of 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, 548 (pro-
hibiting “slavery and involuntary servitude” in territory north of compromise line).  
82. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
83. Id. at 1488 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
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Amendment) and Jacob Howard insisted that they did not disagree with 
Sumner on matters of substance.84 They believed, like many other 
Republicans, that once blacks were free, they became citizens, and there-
fore enjoyed equal civil rights under the law.85 To be sure, this was not 
the universal view: Senator Edgar Cowan disagreed—in his view the 
Amendment granted only freedom, not equality of any sort.86 But the 
idea that ending slavery meant citizenship and equal civil liberty was 
common among Republican supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.87 And therefore it is no surprise that the 
Civil Rights Act was written specifically to secure citizenship and equal 
civil rights. 
Rather, Trumbull and his allies preferred the language of the 
Northwest Ordinance for a number of reasons. First, unlike Sumner’s 
proposal, the language of the Ordinance had no foreign associations.88 
Second, the Northwest Ordinance had deep connections to the 
American political tradition.89 These concerns are reminiscent of current 
debates about the use of foreign materials in constitutional interpreta-
tion, except that in this case the issue concerned drafting constitutional 
text, and not interpreting it.90 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Northwest Ordinance of-
fered familiar language that most supporters of the Amendment could 
agree on. During his debate with Sumner, Trumbull emphasized the 
                                                 
84. See id. (discussing disagreement over precise wording, but not substance, of 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
85. See Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Bill of Rights 48 (1986) (“Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment 
effectively overruled Dred Scott so that blacks were entitled to all rights of citizens.”); Jack 
M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1801, 1816 (2010) [hereinafter 
Balkin, Reconstruction Power] (“The Reconstruction Republicans believed that once 
blacks became free, they enjoyed all the rights of citizens.”). 
86. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen. Edgar 
Cowan) (“That amendment, everybody knows and nobody dare deny, was simply made to 
liberate the negro slave from his master. That is all there is of it.”); see also id. at 477 
(statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury) (“[T]he effect of that amendment is simply to say 
that a person who heretofore was a slave of another shall be no longer his slave, and it 
operates no further.”). 
87. Curtis, supra note 85, at 48; Balkin, Reconstruction Power, supra note 85, at 1816. 
88. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull) (noting he was unsure that phrases “copied from the French Revolution[] are 
the best words for us to adopt”). 
89. See id. at 1489 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (stating he preferred “good old 
Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers in the ordinance of 1787” over “French 
constitutions or French codes”). 
90. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing use of foreign materials in interpreting Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause), with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) 
(Scalia, J.) (distinguishing between use of foreign examples in drafting constitution and 
interpreting existing one). 
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need to settle quickly on basic language that would get the job done, and 
the reason is not difficult to see.91 Time was pressing. The legal force of 
the Emancipation Proclamation—arguably based on the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief powers—might last only so long as the war contin-
ued. Once the war ended, the status quo might unravel. Therefore, it was 
more important to agree on something quickly than to worry about 
achieving the perfect formula. The language of the Ordinance would do 
well in a pinch. Moreover, it perfectly symbolized the framing genera-
tion’s opposition to the evils of slavery and their hopes for its eventual 
elimination. What better way to end slavery in the United States than to 
extend the Framers’ formula to the entire nation?  
Fourth, a distinct advantage of the language of the Northwest 
Ordinance was that it had been written by Thomas Jefferson, who was not 
only the author of the Declaration of Independence, but also the 
founder of what later became the Democratic Party. Such language 
might help—and probably did help—to win the support of War 
Democrats, including President Lincoln’s Vice President and successor, 
Andrew Johnson.92 Accordingly, proponents of the Amendment rou-
tinely referred to it as incorporating the language of the “Jeffersonian” 
ordinance.93 
But the choice of 1787 language leads to an interesting interpretive 
question: The 1864 language is based on an eighteenth-century ordi-
nance that predates the Constitution itself. Does this mean that, in con-
struing the Amendment, one should be guided by the understandings of 
“slavery” not only in 1864, but also those at the time of the Founding or 
the American Revolution? 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, Justice Antonin Scalia had no diffi-
culty reaching back to 1688 to decide whether, in 1791, the original pub-
lic meaning of the right to bear arms included an individual right of self-
defense.94 (Indeed, he also reached forward to Reconstruction, but that 
raises a different set of interpretive problems for a method that claims 
fidelity to “original public meaning.”95) His fellow originalist, Justice 
                                                 
91. See Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull) (pointing out that even if proposed language was not perfect, “a majority of the 
committee thought they were the best words; they accomplish the object,” and that if 
senators bickered over minor changes in wording “we shall have very little legislation”). 
92. Michael Vorenberg, Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery and 
the Thirteenth Amendment 58–59 (2001) (“Trumbull played to the War Democrats by 
claiming that the committee simply borrowed the language of Thomas Jefferson . . . .”). 
93. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. James 
R. Doolittle) (“They are both in the Jeffersonian ordinance.”); see also Vorenberg, supra 
note 92, at 59 (“The ‘Jeffersonian’ label stuck to the Amendment throughout the congres-
sional debates.”). 
94. 554 U.S. 570, 608 (2008). 
95. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 Harv. L. 
Rev. 145, 173 (2008) (“[L]ater commentary is at best imperfect evidence of what the 
American people meant when they discussed, drafted, and ratified an arms-bearing 
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Clarence Thomas, has seen nothing wrong with looking to late-
seventeenth-century manuals on childrearing to decide the original 
meaning of the First Amendment of 1791.96 If such evidence is 
permissible, then perhaps constitutional interpreters should be able to 
consider the Framers’ vision of slavery as well as the views of the 
Reconstruction founders when creating constructions of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
To be sure, this Essay makes a far more modest claim than either 
Justices Scalia or Thomas when they have looked to late-seventeenth-
century materials to interpret texts written at the close of the eighteenth 
century. They have pointed to this history as evidence of original public 
meaning at the time of ratification, which they regarded as binding on 
later generations. By contrast, this Essay merely suggests that because the 
Thirteenth Amendment quotes the Northwest Ordinance almost verba-
tim, evidence about the concept of slavery at the Founding might be a 
permissible source for constitutional construction to make sense of and 
apply the Thirteenth Amendment’s general prohibition on “slavery” to 
the extent that the text is vague, abstract, or indeterminate. Such evi-
dence, while helpful, need not be conclusive.97 
When the constitutional text is abstract, vague, or indeterminate, 
later generations must engage in constitutional construction to apply it 
to current problems.98 In constitutional construction, history serves not 
as a command, but as a resource for understanding and furthering a 
transgenerational project of self-governance.99 Because the project of 
building out the Constitution over time is transgenerational, interpreters 
engaged in constitutional construction are not limited to the expecta-
tions, understandings, and statements of principle made roughly con-
temporaneous with the moment of ratification. Instead, interpreters may 
look later in the American tradition to fill out abstract or vague concepts 
                                                                                                                 
amendment in the years between 1787 and 1791.”); Jack M. Balkin, Is Heller an Original 
Meaning Decision?, Balkinization (July 2, 2008, 9:31 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2008/07/is-heller-original-meaning-decision.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing Scalia’s best evidence comes from nineteenth-century views, which may be per-
missible constructions of text but should not be confused with its original meaning). 
96. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2752–53 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (looking to Puritan childrearing practices to understand children’s lack of 
First Amendment rights at Founding and arguing that “[a] complete understanding of the 
founding generation’s views on children and the parent-child relationship must therefore 
begin roughly a century [earlier than the Founding] in colonial New England”). 
97. See Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 54, at 228–29, 257–58, 333 (treating 
history as resource that helps interpreters generate permissible constructions consistent 
with original meaning of text). 
98. Id. at 7 (“When adopters use [vague or abstract] language that delegates constitu-
tional construction to future generations, fidelity to the Constitution requires future gen-
erations to engage in constitutional construction.”). 
99. Id. at 23, 199–200, 228–29, 256–58, 268–70, 333, 342 n.2 (describing use of his-
tory as resource for construction). 
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like “freedom of speech” or “equal protection of the laws.” Equally im-
portantly, they can also look earlier in the American tradition to under-
stand where these ideas came from and what they meant to people in an 
earlier era. 
Looking back to the Founding, one discovers that the word “slavery” 
actually has a capacious meaning, far outstripping the practices of racial-
ized chattel slavery that the Reconstruction Era framers sought to end in 
1864. 
Consider the January 1773 response of the Council Chamber in the 
Boston Province House to an address by colonial Governor Thomas 
Hutchinson. Hutchinson, of course, was named by the Crown and most 
definitely not elected by the good people of Massachusetts, and he de-
fended the British theory of parliamentary sovereignty over the colonies 
in North America.100 As Alison LaCroix notes, the members of the 
Council interpreted Hutchinson’s claim that Parliament had “supreme 
authority” as equivalent to proclaiming “unlimited authority,” which led 
the Bostonians to state, “[I]f Supreme Authority includes unlimited 
Authority, the Subjects of it are emphatically Slaves.”101 That same year, 
the Boston-Gazette and Country Journal had printed a letter from “An 
Elector” who also took issue with Hutchinson’s (and the British) claims 
to “sovereign” authority. “NO Line can be drawn,” concluded the author, 
“between the usurped Power of Parliament, and a State of Slavery in the 
Colonies.”102  
There is nothing aberrational in such language. Bernard Bailyn’s 
magisterial study of pamphlets written during the run-up to the 
American Revolution, which provided the basis for his deservedly famous 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, also emphasized the repeated 
invocation of “slavery” as the likely fate of the colonists if they submitted 
to the outrageous claims of their British would-be rulers. “‘Slavery,’” he 
writes, “was a central concept in eighteenth century political discourse. 
As the absolute political evil, it appears in every statement of political 
principle, in every discussion of constitutionalism or legal rights, in every 
exhortation to resistance.”103 As a “political concept,” slavery “had spe-
cific meaning which a later generation would lose.”104 As an example, 
Bailyn quotes a 1747 newspaper writer who declared that those who are 
“under the absolute and arbitrary direction of one man are all slaves, for 
he that is obliged to act or not to act according to the arbitrary will and 
pleasure of a governor, or his director, is as much a slave as he who is 
                                                 
100. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism 81–83 
(2010). 
101. Id. at 83. 
102. Id. at 82. 
103. Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 232 (enlarged 
ed. 1992).  
104. Id. at 233. 
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obliged to act or not according to the arbitrary will and pleasure of a 
master or his overseer.”105 “[T]he slaves of the latter,” the author wrote, 
“deserve highly to be pitied, the slaves of the former to be held in the 
utmost contempt.”106 There was a spectrum of slavery, and some varieties 
might be worse than others. But, as Bailyn explains, “The degradation of 
chattel slaves—painfully visible and unambiguously established in law—
was only the final realization of what the loss of freedom could mean every-
where.”107  
The Americans were not particularly innovative in their rhetoric. By 
invoking ideas of slavery, the colonists drew on well-established rhetorical 
conventions within British thought. Both supporters and opponents of 
the seventeenth-century English revolutionaries drew on the imagery of 
slavery to justify their positions. A 1659 pamphlet justifying Oliver 
Cromwell’s anti-Monarchist followers described the “yoak of slavery” 
imposed by the executed King Charles I and his supporters that the 
Parliamentarians had “so long fought against.”108 This was the 
“depriv[ation]” of their “proper and true birth-right” as Englishmen: “the 
Liberty of petitioning Parliaments.”109 Conversely, supporters of the 1660 
Restoration of monarchical rule denounced the wickedness of the 
Cromwellian regime as its own form of enslavement: Tracts in the late 
1650s and early 1660s referred to the Cromwell years as “slavery and op-
pressions . . . more intolerable then [sic] the Egyptian bondage” in which 
“cunning Sophisters . . . deluded many thousand persons” with “pre-
tended Liberty” that “proved nothing else but an imaginary Chymera.”110 
Another tract called upon God to “redeem” the country from the “more 
then [sic] Egyptian slavery” that had kept the “Lawful King” Charles II 
“from his just Rights.”111 Yet another pamphlet referred to the “Egyptian 
darkness,” during which “zealous Puritans” “cr[ied] liberty and refor-
mation” but “there was nothing but slavery and confusion.”112 A 1659 
pamphlet, shortly before the Restoration, decried “our Liberties scorn-
fully trodden underfoot” during Cromwell’s rule, when “Treasures 
                                                 
105. Id. at 234 (citation omitted). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (emphasis added).  
108. The Humble Advice, and Tender Declaration, or Remonstrance of Several 
Thousands of Men Fearing God, in the County of Durham, Northumberland, and the 
Adjacent Parts of Westmerland and Cumberland, with the North Part of Yorkshire; to the 
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109. Id. 
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[were] expended on Instruments of our slavery.”113 Not surprisingly, 
“slavery,” much like the words “freedom” or “democracy” in our own day, 
was an “essentially contested concept” in these debates; it was available 
and useful to both sides in a political dispute. (Another example is 
Justice Bradley’s suggestion that requiring a white restaurateur to serve 
an African American would constitute “slavery” for the former.114)  
Or consider the stirring refrain at the conclusion of each stanza of 
Rule Britannia, originally written in 1740 and quickly adopted as the an-
them of the British Navy: “Rule, Britannia! Britannia, rule the waves! / 
Britons never, never, never shall be slaves.”115 Stanzas two and four elabo-
rate the theme of tyranny as slavery: 
The nations not so blest as thee  
Must, in their turn, to tyrants fall,  
While thou shalt flourish great and free:  
The dread and envy of them all. . . .  
 
Thee haughty tyrants ne’er shall tame: 
All their attempts to bend thee down, 
Will but arouse thy generous flame; 
But work their woe, and thy renown. 
 
[Refrain] Rule, Britannia! Britannia, rule the waves! 
Britons never, never, never shall be slaves.116 
When American colonists called their condition slavery, therefore, 
they were not simply engaged in overheated rhetoric. They were simply 
repeating what they had learned as part of their socialization as “free 
Englishmen.” One of the most famous slogans of the Revolution was the 
motto “no taxation without representation.” Consider John Dickinson’s 
1768 comment, made in the form of a “letter” from a farmer in 
Pennsylvania: “Those who are taxed without their own consent expressed 
by themselves of their representatives are slaves. We are taxed without our 
consent expressed by ourselves or our representatives. We are therefore—
SLAVES.”117 Josiah Quincy concluded a 1774 diatribe against the British 
as follows: “I speak it with grief—I speak it with anguish—Britons are our 
oppressors. I speak it with alarm—I speak it with indignation—we are 
slaves.”118 Even John Adams spoke of “the most abject sort of slaves,” 
                                                 
113. To the Parliament of the Common-wealth of England, &c., The Humble 
Petition and Representation of Divers Well-Affected of the County of South-hampton 
(London, R.W. 1659). 
114. See Fairman, supra note 69, at 564 (reporting Justice Bradley’s observations). 
115. Rule, Britannia! Lyrics, http://www.hymns.me.uk/rule-brittania-lyrics.htm (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited June 20, 2012). We are grateful to Eugene 
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117. Bailyn, supra note 103, at 232–33 (emphasis in original).  
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referring not to chattel slaves in pre-revolutionary Massachusetts, but to 
the colonists chafing under British mistreatment.119 A 1765 pamphlet 
reprinted in Bailyn’s collection of pre-revolutionary writings exhorts his 
fellow “freemen of the colony of Connecticut” to “stand for their abso-
lute rights and defend them,” which meant, among other things, trying 
to persuade misguided supporters of British oppression to mend their 
ways.120 Should they do so, they should be forgiven. However, if a sup-
porter “is in any post that unjustly grinds the face of the poor or that 
contributes to your slavery, ask him peaceably to resign it, and if he re-
fuses to, use him in such a manner that he will be glad to do anything for 
a quiet life. For Britons never must be slaves.”121  
Indeed, as Aziz Rana has suggested in his study of settler ideology, it 
was crucial to white colonists’ sense of themselves within the British 
Empire that they not be regarded as slaves; their freedom depended on 
the existence of other classes of persons who were not free, who could 
not own property, and who could be forced to work against their will.122 
Therefore, it was natural to understand political grievances—including 
grievances about representation and property—in the language of slav-
ery.123 
The colonial vision that opposed slavery to republican liberty held 
that slavery meant more than simply being free from compulsion to labor 
by threats or physical coercion. Rather, the true marker of slavery was 
that slaves were always potentially subject to domination and to the arbi-
trary will of another person. Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning 
Government,124 which was highly influential in eighteenth-century America 
and which especially influenced Thomas Jefferson, defined slavery as ar-
bitrary government, in which people could not make laws for themselves. 
“[W]e have no other way of distinguishing between free nations, and 
such as are not so,” Sidney wrote, “than that the free are governed by 
their own laws and magistrates, according to their own mind, and that 
the others either have willingly subjected themselves, or are by force 
brought under the power of one or more men, to be ruled according to 
his or their pleasure.”125 It made no difference that the master was kind; 
what mattered was that at any moment he could subject the slave to his 
domination: “[H]e is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the 
world, as well as he who serves the worst; and he does serve him, if he 
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must obey his commands, and depends upon his will.”126 One might well 
prefer life under a “benevolent despot” to being under the thumb of a 
“tyrant,” but “despotism” it remained—a condition altogether different 
from the American Declaration’s vision of government by “consent of the 
governed.”  
It thus can occasion no surprise at all that a young soldier in New 
York wrote his father, on July 12, 1776, that “I most heartily congratulate 
you on the Declaration of Independence, a Declaration which happily 
dissolves on Connexions with the Kingdom where the Name of King is 
synonymous to that of Tyrant, and the name of Subjects to that of 
Slaves.”127 Nor should one be surprised that Samuel Adams wrote to 
Richard Henry Lee, complaining about the new Constitution proposed 
by the Philadelphia Convention: “The few haughty Families, think They 
must govern. The Body of the People tamely consent & submit to be 
their Slaves. This unravels the Mystery of Millions being enslaved by the 
few!”128 
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127. Extract of a Letter from a Young Man in the Army at New-York, to His Father in 
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States (1787), reprinted in The Founders’ Constitution, supra, at 119, 121. 
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printed in The Founders’ Constitution, supra, at 132, 133 (expressing concern about 
Congress’s power to create new national capital). 
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Given these examples, one should not be shocked to read John C. 
Calhoun, in his Fort Hill address half a century later, arguing that suf-
frage was necessary to prevent enslavement: 
If, without the right of suffrage, our rulers would oppress us, so, 
without the right of self-protection, the major would equally 
oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of 
the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers; 
and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the 
stronger.129 
However grotesque it may be to read Calhoun complaining that his 
white South Carolina compatriots are being reduced to the status of 
slaves, he was merely drawing on a well-established language by which 
those who deemed themselves the victims of illegitimate domination 
could describe their sad state as “enslavement,” and mobilize others to 
take up the cause of preventing it. 
One can see echoes of these ideas in modern arguments. The 1956 
platform of the Republican Party proudly proclaimed that under the 
Eisenhower Administration “[t]he advance of Communism and its en-
slavement of people has been checked . . . . Forces of freedom are at 
work in the nations still enslaved by Communist imperialism.”130 
Similarly, in his recent biography of John F. Kennedy, Chris Matthews 
notes that in 1946 John F. Kennedy “was calling the Soviet Union, our 
wartime ally, a ‘slave state’” during his successful inaugural run for office 
as a representative from Massachusetts.131 Neither the Republicans nor 
JFK believed that people in the Soviet Union were owned, bought, and 
sold, with their children having the same status (and vulnerability) as 
chattel slaves. The use of “slavery” here meant the arbitrary domination 
characteristic of a police state, which is not too far distant from the colo-
nists’ concerns. 
The modern Tea Party has resuscitated the connections between 
government overreach and slavery.132 Alabama Tea Party candidate Rick 
Barber explained in a video that government taxation (even with repre-
sentation!) is a form of slavery “when someone is forced to work for 
months to pay taxes so that a total stranger can get a free meal, medical 
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http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25838#ixzz1cxgbkwcl (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review).  
131. Chris Matthews, Jack Kennedy: Elusive Hero 87 (2011).  
132. See Noah Kristula-Green, The Tea Party’s Growing Slavery Obsession, 
FrumForum (Aug. 5, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://www.frumforum.com/the-tea-partys-growing-
slavery-obsession/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (linking to videos of town hall 
event on Affordable Care Act and Rick Barber commercial). 
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procedure, or a bailout.”133 Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, explaining his 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act, noted that while he had no objec-
tion to tending to the poor as an act of personal charity, he rejected out-
right the idea of a government right to health care: “[Y]ou have to real-
ize what that implies. It’s not an abstraction. I’m a physician. That means 
you have a right to come to my house and conscript me. It means you 
believe in slavery.”134 Some lawyers have even suggested that compulsory 
pro bono requirements are akin to the “involuntary servitude” banned by 
the Thirteenth Amendment, though such protests have been met with 
general ridicule.135 
How should these ideas from the American Revolution be under-
stood today?136 All of the pamphleteers and orators were familiar with 
chattel slavery; indeed, Bailyn’s and Rana’s point is that the colonists 
were all too familiar with it, for it marked precisely the status they wanted 
to avoid.137 Chattel slavery was but one form of slavery (hence the addi-
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Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 280–84 (1974) (describing thought experiment 
of “demoktesis” and showing inconsistency between democracy and libertarianism). One 
should also acknowledge the work of the indefatigable Randy Barnett, both with regard to 
his attempts to revive the works of such nineteenth-century anarchists as Lysander 
Spooner and his own work defending libertarianism, including its application to the 
United States Constitution. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost 
Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (2004) (describing Barnett’s libertarian theory 
of constitutional interpretation); Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and 
the Rule of Law (2000) (describing Barnett’s libertarian political theory). 
137. The Massachusetts colonists who feared that the British wished to reduce them 
to the status of “slaves” lived in a regime where slavery was legal. There were more than 
400 slaves in Boston in 1705, and the Commonwealth did not abolish slavery until 1783. 
Black Heritage Trail, Museum of African American History, http://www.maah.org/
trail.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited May 30, 2012). Slavery was 
effectively abolished by a 1783 Massachusetts state court decision interpreting the 1780 
constitution, drafted in large measure by John Adams, which declared that “all men are 
born free and equal, and have . . . the right of enjoying and defending their lives and lib-
erty.” Commonwealth v. Jennison (Mass. 1783) (unreported), in Paul Finkelman, The Law 
of Freedom and Bondage 36–37 (1986). Interestingly enough, the 1778 draft constitution 
that had been rejected by the populace both recognized slavery and deprived free blacks 
of suffrage. Emancipation in Massachusetts, Slavery in the North, 
http://www.slavenorth.com/massemancip.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
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tional qualifying adjective); it was the limiting case that symbolized the 
fullest loss of freedom. The colonists saw an obvious analogy between the 
arbitrary rule of a master (however kind, in Sidney’s words138) and the 
arbitrary rule of the British Empire. Their language seems incredible to-
day only because people have forgotten the connections between their 
language and the republican political theory that made the comparison 
obvious. 
IV. THE ABOLITIONIST’S DILEMMA 
During the nineteenth century, people employed the idea of slavery 
in multiple ways. Early abolitionists recalled the Declaration of 
Independence and invoked the struggle against British tyranny as a rea-
son for Americans to abolish slavery, connecting slavery to republican-
ism.139 
                                                                                                                 
visited Aug. 8, 2012). Vermont, not yet a state, had, as the independent “Commonwealth 
of Vermont,” abolished slavery in 1777. Slavery in Vermont, Slavery in the North, 
http://www.slavenorth.com/vermont.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2012). 
138. See supra text accompanying note 126 (“[H]e is a slave who serves the best and 
gentlest man in the world.”). 
139. Just as the revolutionary generation opposed republicanism to slavery, early 
abolitionists opposed slavery to republicanism. This opposition was stated perhaps most 
forcefully in the early debates that led up to the Missouri Compromise. In 1819, Repre-
sentative Timothy Fuller of Massachusetts argued that because the United States 
government was required to guarantee each state a republican form of government, Con-
gress could not admit Missouri as a slave state, because a state whose constitution 
recognized slavery was not republican, and Fuller proceeded to quote the Declaration of 
Independence as proof. 33 Annals of Cong. 1179–80 (1819) (statement of Rep. Timothy 
Fuller). At this point, the report of the congressional proceedings continued: 
Mr. F was here interrupted by several gentlemen, who thought it improper to 
question in debate the republican character of the slaveholding states, which 
had also a tendency, as one gentleman (Mr. Colston, of Virginia,) said, to de-
prive those states of the right to hold slaves as property, and he adverted to the 
probability that there might be slaves in the gallery listening to the debate. 
Id. at 1180. Fuller, simply by putting together the language of the Guarantee Clause and 
the framers’ idea that slavery was antirepublican, had thrown a rhetorical hydrogen bomb 
into the debate. If Fuller was right, not only should Missouri not be admitted as a slave 
state, but the United States had a duty to end slavery in all of the existing slave states as 
well. Fuller quickly backtracked, but only partly, “assur[ing] the gentlemen that nothing 
was further from his thoughts than to question on that floor the right of Virginia and 
other States, which held slaves when the Constitution was established, to continue to hold 
them.” Id. Those states were grandfathered in, and Congress could do nothing to disturb 
them. Although Fuller did not wish “to excite local animosities,” he nevertheless claimed 
that a republican government was a government without slavery, a government in which 
“all men are free, and have an equal right to liberty, and all other privileges.” Id. at 1182. 
Out of necessity, and for the sake of preserving the Union, slaveholding states were per-
mitted to make exceptions to this principle only so far as necessary “until they should 
think it proper or safe to conform to the pure principle by abolishing slavery.” Id.; see 
Wiecek, supra note 55, at 143–47 (discussing role played by Guarantee Clause in debates 
over Missouri Compromise). Fuller’s 1819 argument that the federal government lacked 
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But these comparisons—and the eighteenth-century rhetoric of slav-
ery—complicated the abolitionist cause before the Civil War. 
Abolitionists sought to eliminate African chattel slavery; but what else 
constituted “slavery” and would have to vanish along with it? And would 
acknowledging these connections and entailments undermine the cause 
of abolition? For example, if slavery was the opposite of republicanism, 
did this mean that limits on suffrage—for example, property qualifica-
tions140—were also slavery? If marriage was slavery, as some early feminists 
argued,141 did that mean that one could not eliminate chattel slavery 
without also altering the relations between the sexes? If wage labor was 
slavery,142 did this mean that Northern factories would have to be trans-
formed at the same time as Southern plantations? Such considerations 
gave abolitionists incentives to narrow the concept of slavery in order to 
win supporters and make their cause more plausible to the broadest 
group of Americans. 
Ironically, it was Southern defenders of black chattel slavery who 
consistently emphasized the potential reach of critiques of “slavery” in 
order to discomfit their opponents, often employing the arguments 
made by contemporary reformers of the English labor system. English 
reformers, living in a country that had already abolished chattel slavery, 
sometimes compared the conditions of the working class to American 
treatment of blacks, with the goal of arguing for reform of working con-
ditions in England. Southern defenders of black chattel slavery offered 
similar comparisons for precisely the opposite purpose—to stress the 
moral equivalence between chattel and wage slavery. This not only 
branded abolitionists with the charge of hypocrisy, but also portrayed 
them as dangerous revolutionaries who threatened the North as much as 
the South. In order to avoid these charges, Northern abolitionists had to 
sharply distinguish chattel slavery from other injustices, which, therefore, 
could no longer be called slavery. 
                                                                                                                 
the power to create new slave states was eventually taken up by the Republican Party in the 
1850s in a different form. Relying primarily on the Due Process Clause, Republicans ar-
gued that slavery could not exist in federal territories. See Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under 
Law 140–41 & nn.5–6 (1965) (describing Due Process argument in Republican Party plat-
forms); Republican Platform of 1856, in 1 National Party Platforms, supra note 76, at 27 
(“[I]t becomes our duty to maintain this [due process] provision of the Constitution 
against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing Slavery in the Territories 
. . . by positive legislation . . . .”); see generally Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section 
One? The Abolitionist Origins of The Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. of Legal Analysis 165, 
177–83 (2011) (describing development of abolitionist and antislavery arguments based 
on Due Process Clause in antebellum era). 
140. Cf. Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy 
in the United States 24 (2000) (noting gradual dismantling of property qualifications in 
United States in antebellum period).  
141. See infra text accompanying notes 152, 167–169 (describing early suffragists’ 
comparison between marriage and slavery).  
142. See infra text accompanying notes 143–150, 156–166 (describing arguments 
comparing wage labor to slavery). 
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For example, Southern defenders of chattel slavery pointed to—and 
strongly criticized—forms of wage slavery that were developing in indus-
trial societies. Southern defenders of slavery argued that abolitionists 
were hypocrites because they did not attack white wage slavery. Indeed, 
defenders argued, masters took far better care of their slaves than factory 
owners took care of their employees. Abolitionists complaining about 
slavery in the South, they charged, should tend to conditions in the 
North (and in Great Britain) first. In an 1845 “Letter to an English 
Abolitionist,” South Carolina Senator James Hammond claimed that 
there was “perhaps a less humane system of Slavery in countries continu-
ally supplied with fresh laborers at a cheap rate.”143 A sick or malnour-
ished worker could be ruthlessly fired and replaced with another, health-
ier employee, whereas on a properly run slave plantation the master had 
incentives to keep his slaves healthy.144 Thus, Hammond argued that 
there was a “spirit of discontent wherever nominal free labor prevails, 
with its ostensive privileges and its dismal servitude.”145 In fact, 
Hammond argued, making English workers into chattel slaves would 
constitute their “emancipation”:  
[I]n Great Britain the poor and laboring classes of your own 
race and color, not only your fellow-beings, but your fellow-
citizens, are more miserable and degraded, morally and 
physically, than our slaves; to be elevated to the actual condition 
of whom, would be to these, your fellow-citizens, a most glorious 
act of emancipation.146 
Hammond also chastised abolitionist reformers:  
When you look around you, how dare you talk to us before the 
world of Slavery? For the condition of your wretched laborers, 
you, and every Briton who is not one of them, are responsible 
before God and man. If you are really humane, philanthropic, 
and charitable, here are objects for you. Relieve them. 
Emancipate them. Raise them from the condition of brutes, to 
the level of human beings—of American slaves, at least. Do not 
for an instant suppose that the name of being freemen is the 
slightest comfort to them, . . . the most abject and degraded 
wretches that ever bowed beneath the oppressor’s yoke.147 
The most brilliant Southern defender of chattel slavery was un-
doubtedly the Virginian George Fitzhugh, whose magnum opus was 
                                                 
143. James Henry Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist (Jan. 28, 1845), in 
The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830–1860, at 168, 
171 (Drew Gilpin Faust ed., 1981). 
144. See George Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, or Slaves Without Masters 28 (C. Vann 
Woodward ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1960) (1857) [hereinafter Fitzhugh, Cannibals All] 
(“Masters treat their sick, infant, and helpless slaves well, not only from feeling and affec-
tion, but from motives of self-interest.”). 
145. Hammond, supra note 143, at 177. 
146. Id. at 193. 
147. Id. at 196. 
2012] DANGEROUS THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 1491 
 
Cannibals All!148 Like Hammond, he denounced as hypocrites European 
abolitionists who were “loud in their abuse of our form of slavery, whilst 
they are busily adopting worse forms”149 that constituted “white slavery.” 
“[T]he white laboring class,” Fitzhugh argued, “are remitted to slavery to 
capital, which is much more cruel and exacting than domestic slavery.”150  
Defenders of slavery argued that chattel slaves were better treated 
for another reason. Unlike factory workers, who were bound by contract 
to their employers, chattel slaves were protected by familial benevolence; 
a master’s connection to his slaves was compared to family relationships, 
which were by stipulation benign.151 (Ironically, at the same time, early 
suffragists were trying to argue in the opposite direction—that family re-
lationships were relationships of unjustified domination, and that the 
condition of women, especially in marriage, was akin to slavery.152) 
All of these critiques, whatever their motivation—or their accuracy—
gave abolitionists incentive to maintain a sharp divide between chattel 
slavery and other forms of economic injustice, as well as between slavery 
and the treatment of women. The elimination of African slavery was par-
amount; remedying other injustices would have to wait. Moreover, calling 
these other practices and conditions “slavery” only confused matters. The 
easiest approach was to argue that the differences between them were 
matters of kind and not merely of degree. Ideology and political pru-
dence alike seemed to converge on a limited notion of “slavery.”  
Thus, the attempt by slavery’s most devoted opponents to distinguish 
Southern slavery from newly emerging forms of economic inequality as-
sisted the cabining of the concept of slavery before the Civil War. 
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner in his “Barbarism of Slavery” 
speech, for example, defined slavery by reference to a host of Southern 
slave codes that, among other things, allowed masters to buy and sell 
other human beings and to treat as their property the issue of their chat-
                                                 
148. Fitzhugh, Cannibals All, supra note 144; see Eugene D. Genovese, The World 
the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation 124–31 (1969) (providing extensive 
discussion of George Fitzhugh and his defense of chattel slavery).  
149. George Fitzhugh, Southern Thought, XXIII De Bow’s Rev. 337 (1857), re-
printed in The Ideology of Slavery, supra note 143, at 274, 275. 
150. Id. at 277. Had Fitzhugh wished, of course, he could have borrowed extensively 
from Friedrich Engels’s masterwork, The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844, 
which described the travails of workers in Birmingham. Friedrich Engels, The Condition 
of the Working-Class in England in 1844 (Florence Kelley Wischnewetzky trans., George 
Allen & Unwin 1950) (1892). Richard Hofstadter long ago referred to John C. Calhoun as 
“the Marx of the master class,” Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, and 
the Men Who Made It 87 (1946), but that title really should go to Fitzhugh. 
151. See Fitzhugh, Cannibals All, supra note 144, at 205 (“[B]esides wife and chil-
dren, brothers and sisters, dogs, horses, birds and flowers—slaves, also, belong to the fam-
ily circle. . . . [T]he interests of the master and slave are bound up together, and each in 
his appropriate sphere naturally endeavors to promote the happiness of the other.”). 
152. Stanley, supra note 23, at 179 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton on “nearly paral-
lel” status of slave codes and laws governing married women). 
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tels.153 In 1847, William Lloyd Garrison dismissed those who would analo-
gize the treatment of the white working class to slavery:  
If the white laboring men in America are slaves, whose fault is it? 
They are Slaves that hold the sceptre of Sovereignty in their own 
hands. Why do they not use it for their own emancipation? They 
have nobody to blame but themselves. . . . Is is [sic] so with the 
chattel Slaves?154 
After the Civil War, however, with chattel slavery abolished, some ac-
tivists sought to return to the older understanding and describe other 
conditions as instantiations of “slavery.”155 Speaking at a reunion of anti-
                                                 
153. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 2591–92 (1860) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
154. William Lloyd Garrison, Chattel Slavery and Wages Slavery, The Liberator, Oct. 
1, 1847, at 17, 40. Labor organizer William West disagreed with Garrison, arguing that 
“[t]his apparent freedom of the wage slaves is wholly fictitious.” Stanley, supra note 23, at 
20. 
155. In the very first case construing the Thirteenth Amendment, The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the plaintiff butchers argued that the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on “involuntary servitude” was designed to throw off all 
vestiges of European feudalism. A New Orleans ordinance required that butchers practice 
their trade only in slaughterhouses run by seventeen named individuals who ran a state-
created monopoly. Id. at 59; id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting). This, the plaintiffs argued, was 
like European feudal rules that bound serfs to engage in agriculture only on an assigned 
plot of land owned by a feudal lord. New Orleans had made the butchers subject to the 
arbitrary will of a corporation just as peasants had been subject to the arbitrary will of an 
overlord: 
Is not this “a servitude?” Might it not be so considered in a strict sense? It is like 
the “thirlage” of the old Scotch law and the banalités of seignioral France; which 
were servitudes undoubtedly. But, if not strictly a servitude, it is certainly a ser-
vitude in a more popular sense, and, being an enforced one, it is an 
involuntary servitude. Men are surely subjected to a servitude when, through-
out three parishes, embracing 1200 square miles, every man and every woman 
in them is compelled to refrain from the use of their own land and exercise of 
their own industry and the improvement of their own property, in a way con-
fessedly lawful and necessary in itself, and made unlawful and unnecessary only 
because, at their cost, an exclusive privilege is granted to seventeen other per-
sons to improve and exercise it for them. We have here the “servients” and the 
“dominants” and the “thraldom” of the old seignioral system. The servients in 
this case are all the inhabitants in any manner using animals brought to the 
markets for sale or for slaughter. The dominants are “the seventeen” made into 
a corporation, with these seignioral rights and privileges. The masters are these 
seventeen, who alone can admit or refuse other members to their corporation. 
The abused persons are the community, who are deprived of what was a com-
mon right and bound under a thraldom. 
Id. at 50–51 (reporting plaintiffs’ argument). Justice Field’s dissent, while not conclusively 
resolving the Thirteenth Amendment issue, agreed that the comparison to feudalism was 
apt: “The prohibitions imposed by this act upon butchers and dealers in cattle in these 
parishes, and the special privileges conferred upon the favored corporation, are similar in 
principle and as odious in character as the restrictions imposed in the last century upon 
the peasantry in some parts of France . . . .” Id. at 92–94 (Field, J., dissenting). 
The majority dismissed the butchers’ Thirteenth Amendment argument curtly, label-
ing it “a microscopic search . . . to find in [the Thirteenth Amendment] . . . a reference to 
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slavery activists in 1874, George W. Julian argued, “The abolition of 
poverty is the next work in order and the Abolitionist who does not see 
this fails to grasp the logic of the Anti-Slavery movement, and calls a halt 
in the inevitable march of progress.”156 “African slavery was simply one 
form of the domination of capital over the poor,” Julian explained. “The 
system of Southern slavery was the natural outgrowth of that generally 
accepted political philosophy which makes the protection of property the 
chief end of Government. . . .”157 Julian called for workers to “wage war 
against the new forms of slavery which are everywhere insidiously in-
trenching themselves behind the power of combined capital, and barring 
the door against the principle of equal rights.”158 
Julian was not unique. A member of the Knights of Labor testified 
before the Senate in 1883 that “[t]he working people feel that they are 
under a system of forced slavery.”159 Terence Powderly, the leader of the 
Knights of Labor, described a “new slavery . . . reach[ing] out with a far 
stronger hand than the old,” because “[t]he lash of gold” fell “upon the 
backs of millions.”160 An anonymous trade unionist at the New England 
Labor Reform Convention opined that “[i]n the earliest historical period 
it was total slavery. . . . [A]nd then from serfdom into villenage, and now 
at last we have another form of slavery, which is the wages slavery.”161 
Even Samuel Gompers, the founder of the American Federation of 
Labor, who is usually described as distinctly nonradical, argued in an ar-
ticle on cigar manufacturing in tenements that families were being sacri-
ficed “to the Moloch of wage slavery.”162 
Suffragists also took up the comparison. Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
wrote in 1868 that “[a]ccording to man’s idea, as set forth in his creeds 
and codes, marriage is a condition of slavery.”163 Earlier, in a letter to her 
                                                                                                                 
servitudes, which may have been attached to property in certain localities.” Id. at 69 (ma-
jority opinion). Justice Miller, writing for the majority, reasoned that only servitude to a 
person was covered by the Amendment, not a servitude to land, and “the obvious purpose 
was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.” Id. In this way, Justice Miller 
neatly sidestepped the plaintiffs’ real argument—that a revival of feudal practices, because 
they were inherently antirepublican, would also violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 
156. George W. Julian, The Lessons of the Anti-Slavery Conflict, Address Before the 
Anti-Slavery Reunion (June 10, 1874), in Chi. Trib., July 11, 1874, at 10. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. 1 Comm. of the Senate, 48th Cong., Report of the Committee of the Senate 
upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital, and Testimony Taken by the Committee 
219 (1885). 
160. T.V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor: 1859 to 1889, at 545 (Columbus, Excelsior 
Publ’g House 1890).  
161. Stanley, supra note 23, at 86.  
162. 1 Samuel Gompers Papers 185 (Stuart B. Kaufman ed., 1986).  
163. 2 The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony 178 
(Ann D. Gordon ed., 2000); see also Nancy Isenberg, Sex and Citizenship in Antebellum 
America 107–08 (1998) (describing various comparisons suffragists made between married 
women and slaves, including “civil death” that both slaves and married women suffered). 
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cousin, Stanton had declared that “[t]he rights of humanity are more 
grossly betrayed at the altar than at the auction block of the slave-
holder.”164 Susan B. Anthony, in a speech delivered in 1875, asserted that 
“the first and only efficient work must be to emancipate woman from her 
enslavement.”165 
Before chattel slavery was abolished, such comparisons might have 
been dangerous to the cause of abolition. After the Thirteenth 
Amendment, they could be useful to a wide range of groups who sought 
to show that the condition of laborers or women was akin to a practice 
already condemned in the United States. Nevertheless, the fact of eman-
cipation also had rhetorical effects in the opposite direction. Defenders 
of the status quo could now claim that, with the abolition of chattel slav-
ery, American society was more or less “free.” Evoking Henry Maine, one 
could argue that “status” had given way to “contract.”166 Workers now 
enjoyed the freedom to enter (or refuse to enter) into binding commit-
ments for their labor. However objectionable to labor activists and femi-
nists, the normal operations of markets and family life could not be slav-
ery, which was by definition the worst of evils and had already been erad-
icated by law. Asserting that anything else could be “slavery,” therefore, 
had to be hyperbole.  
For example, by 1918, Congress tried successively to ban child labor 
using the commerce power and the taxing power,167 but it was apparently 
unthinkable to use its powers under Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to eliminate another form of “slavery” or “involuntary servi-
tude” in American society.168 After all, invoking the Thirteenth 
                                                 
164. Stanley, supra note 23, at 177 (quoting Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to 
Gerrit Smith (1851)). 
165. 2 Ida Husted Harper, Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony 1011 (1969). 
166. Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 170 (London, John Murray 11th ed. 1887) 
(“[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract.”). 
167. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (overturning Child Labor 
Tax Act); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)(overturning Keating-Owen Act of 
1916). 
168. See Dina Mishra, Child Labor as Involuntary Servitude: The Failure of Congress 
To Legislate Against Child Labor Pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in the Early 
Twentieth Century, 63 Rutgers L. Rev. 59, 63 (2010) (“Throughout this period, Congress 
never once attempted to enact child labor legislation pursuant to its power under [Section 
2 of] the Thirteenth Amendment.”). Mishra notes two interesting facts about Progressive-
era attempts to outlaw child labor at the federal level. First, “[t]hroughout this early stage 
of the movement to federally limit child labor, members of Congress failed to conceive of 
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involuntary servitude as a legislative basis.” Id. 
at 75. Second, “the descriptions of child labor in congressional hearings and debates dur-
ing this period invoked terminology and concepts underlying the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.” Id. at 76. Indeed, a few members of Congress even compared child labor to slavery 
and to peonage systems, which Congress could surely reach under Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 79, 93. Yet congressmen and senators were either unable or 
unwilling to connect the dots. Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee refused even to 
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Amendment to ban child labor would have cast the charge of slavery 
against two different features of American life simultaneously: the coer-
cion of the market on the one hand, and coercion within family relations 
on the other.169 
Of course, things did not have to happen in this way. The 
Thirteenth Amendment—and the idea of slavery—might have been read 
more broadly. The fact that Jim Crow has been eradicated has not pre-
vented people on the left from attacking policies of racial separation and 
racial discrimination today,170 or people on the right from invoking com-
parisons between affirmative action policies and the segregated South.171  
                                                                                                                 
consider a Thirteenth Amendment theory in a bill proposed by Samuel Gompers, presi-
dent of the American Federation of Labor, and drafted by a government attorney, James 
F. Lawson. Id. at 89 & n.193. Nor did Congress invoke its Thirteenth Amendment power 
in passing the Mann Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2421–2424), the “White Slave Traffic” Act that originally banned transportation of 
women across state lines for “immoral purposes.” Id. at 83 n.143. 
Mishra offers several different explanations for why Congress was unwilling to con-
sider Thirteenth Amendment theories, but ultimately concludes that the failure is “surpris-
ing.” Id. at 91. Mishra’s study is evidence of the multiple and overlapping forms of thought 
and practice that have limited the Thirteenth Amendment’s reach. 
169. Although the Thirteenth Amendment, by its terms, excludes criminal punish-
ments from its reach, it is worth noting that American prisoners have sometimes been 
treated worse than antebellum slaves. David Oshinsky’s important book about the 
Parchman prison system in Mississippi compares conditions at Parchman to chattel slavery 
and finds the slaves better off. David M. Oshinsky, “Worse than Slavery”: Parchman Farm 
and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (unpaginated opening page) (1996). L.G. Shivers, 
writing in 1930, stated that “[t]he convict’s condition [following the Civil War] was much 
worse than slavery. The life of the slave was valuable to the master, but there was no finan-
cial loss . . . if a convict died.” Id. at unpaginated opening page; cf. Sanford Levinson, 
Slavery and the Phenomenology of Torture, 74 Soc. Res. 149, 150 (2007) (arguing torture, 
like slavery, depends on creation of perception that victims have “‘no rights’ that the rest 
of us are ‘bound to respect’” (quoting Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857))). 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s exclusion of criminal punishments has also been used 
to justify chain gangs and other forms of convict labor, especially in the South. See, e.g., 
Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement of Black Americans 
from the Civil War to World War II (2009) (offering a history of systems of convict labor). 
Blackmon notes that his book, examining convict labor in Birmingham, Alabama, was 
inspired by asking a “provocative question”: “What would be revealed if American corpora-
tions were examined through the same sharp lens of historical confrontation as the one 
then being trained on German corporations that relied on Jewish slave labor during World 
War II and the Swiss banks that robbed victims of the Holocaust of their fortunes?” Id. at 3.  
170. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age 
of Colorblindness 2 (2010) (“[W]e use our criminal justice system to label people of color 
‘criminals’ and then engage in all the practices we supposedly left behind.”).  
171. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
747–48 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where 
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts 
. . . have not . . . demonstrat[ed] that we should allow this once again—even for very dif-
ferent reasons.”); id. at 773–80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The segregationists in Brown 
embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in Plessy. Though Brown decisively rejected 
those arguments, today’s dissent replicates them to a distressing extent.”). 
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In any case, at some point in the nineteenth century “slavery” be-
came identified with the particular practice of “chattel slavery,” and the 
qualifying adjective was dropped. This meant that other forms of domi-
nation were described as akin to slavery or with their own qualifying ad-
jectives, like “wage” slavery or “white” slavery, rather than being slavery 
itself. This shift in meaning has had significant consequences for the de-
velopment of American political thought and political discourse, includ-
ing in the twenty-first century. 
V. THE COMPARISON WE HAVE LOST 
It is not simply that people assume that by slavery one means “chattel 
slavery.” Rather, it means that using the term to refer to anything else, 
even if one includes a differentiating adjective like “wage slavery” or 
compares slavery to the abuses leveled on a helpless child by an all-
powerful parent,172 is thought to be “off the wall” or a grievous insult to 
the “real slaves”—generations of African Americans—on whose backs 
these rhetorical claims rest. 
One result of this rhetorical shift is that one cannot simply affirm 
that “chattel slavery” is the worst form of a larger concept called “slavery” 
that includes a variety of practices. Rather, one must deny that almost 
anything else could possibly count as “slavery.” Compare this to our 
treatment of the First Amendment. People do not find it particularly dif-
ficult to acknowledge that imprisoning dissidents is the worst example of 
a larger class of free speech violations. Restricting “slavery” only to its 
worst instantiation—the evil of “chattel slavery”—is a bit like adopting 
John Yoo’s infamous definition of “torture” as requiring a degree of pain 
and debilitation equal to facing the risk of death or organ failure.173 One 
can easily agree that what Yoo describes is a form of “torture”; the dispute 
is whether his description exhausts the concept. It does not, and neither 
should “chattel slavery” be treated as exhausting the meaning of “slav-
ery,” especially if one examines the history of the idea during the 
American Revolution and the Founding. 
To be sure, antipeonage laws passed in the aftermath of the 
Thirteenth Amendment have been applied, even in the present, to 
certain exploitative practices directed against almost helpless workers.174 
In addition, there is the phenomenon of “white slavery” as a euphemism 
                                                 
172. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 78, at 1363–65 (analogizing parental child 
abuse to antebellum slavery and arguing that Thirteenth Amendment provides remedy). 
173. See Memorandum from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc
/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (adopting very 
narrow construction of “torture” in federal statutes in order to insulate certain 
interrogation practices from liability under domestic and international law).  
174. See Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, 546 (1867) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1581, 42 U.S.C. § 1994). 
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for organized prostitution.175 By and large, however, anyone using the 
term “slavery” is expected to demonstrate that the circumstances involved 
are almost as dire as those depicted in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin176 or Toni Morrison’s Beloved.177  
The real question is whether this construction of political meaning 
has been good for American constitutional and political culture, or 
whether something valuable was lost when it became impossible to take 
the founding generations’ claims about slavery and republicanism as any-
thing other than tin-foil-hat thinking, or metaphors run riot. One can 
understand the reaction of people who object to Tea Party claims about 
slavery in precisely this way. People offended by Tea Party comparisons 
between government overreach and slavery might make three objections: 
First, Tea Partiers are engaged in hyperbole or paranoid fantasies of per-
secution; second, Tea Partiers do injury to the memory of the millions 
who died in the Middle Passage and suffered on Southern plantations; 
and third, Tea Partiers are somehow perversely compensating for racial-
ized stereotypes about the recipients of government programs and their 
own anxieties about an increasingly multiracial society.178 
One can acknowledge the founding generation’s view of slavery as 
antirepublicanism and unjustified domination, however, without having 
to accept all of the contemporary Tea Party’s arguments. Neither the 
modern state nor the Affordable Care Act constitutes slavery. Quite to 
the contrary, access to basic necessities like health care may be necessary 
to self-sufficiency and equal opportunity in a modern republic. Market 
                                                 
175. See Mishra, supra note 168, at 82 (describing purposes of Mann Act). 
176. Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Signet Classic 1962) (1852). 
177. Toni Morrison, Beloved (1987). 
178. Sensitivity about political uses of the term “slavery” is not merely a matter of lib-
eral objections to Tea Party rhetoric. Republicans pounced on Vice President Joseph 
Biden when he suggested during a campaign speech in Virginia before an audience in-
cluding many African Americans that “Romney wants to let . . . the big banks once again 
write their own rules, unchain Wall Street. They’re going to put you all back in chains.” 
Rebecca Berg, Biden Warns Romney Policies Would Put Crowd “Back in Chains,” N.Y. 
Times The Caucus (Aug. 14, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/08/14/biden-warns-romney-policies-would-put-crowd-back-in-chains/ (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Aug. 14, 2012, 9:43 PM). Former Mayor of New 
York Rudolph Giuliani, although proclaiming that “I don’t think . . . [Biden is] nuts,” 
nevertheless went on to “wonder if he’s got the kind of balance—probably what I should 
have said is the balance to be president of the United States.” Brian Knowlton, Giuliani 
and Santorum Assail Biden for Virginia Speech, N.Y. Times The Caucus (Aug. 19, 2012, 
1:30 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/giuliani-and-santorum-assail-
biden-for-virginia-speech/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Former Pennsylvania 
Senator Rick Santorum was less charitable; he denounced Biden’s language as “horren-
dous” and accused the Vice President of playing “the race card.” Id. Noting that a con-
servative politician who had made similar remarks “would be pilloried for racial insensitiv-
ity,” the reliably liberal Boston Globe argued in an editorial that Biden should apologize for 
this “gaffe.” Editorial, Biden Should Apologize: “Back in Chains,” Bos. Globe Aug. 17, 
2012, at A14. 
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forces make heath care expensive, and when serious health problems 
arise, they can be catastrophic for families without adequate insurance. 
Universal health care—and corresponding public duties to participate in 
government programs that provide it—may be a valuable amelioration of 
the forms of domination and unfreedom that markets can produce. As 
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli put it in his final remarks before the 
United States Supreme Court after three days of defending the 
Affordable Care Act, “[A]s a result of the health care they will get,” per-
sons who were condemned to untreated illnesses because of lack of 
health insurance or access to Medicaid “will be unshackled from the disa-
bilities that those diseases put on them and have the opportunity to enjoy 
the blessings of liberty.”179 Thus, far from being a form of slavery, univer-
sal health care—if and when it comes to America—will “unshackle” mil-
lions who, without coverage, may be only one serious illness away from 
destitution or death. Individual mandates to purchase health insurance 
may not be the best policy solution, but they are not antirepublican even 
if members of the modern political party called “Republican” mostly dis-
agree. If it is slavery to be put to the choice of buying health insurance or 
paying a tax, then, presumably, so too would being forced to pay taxes to 
the state for a health insurance program like Medicare or Medicaid that 
one would prefer not to support. Unless one is a radical libertarian in-
deed, that is neither a plausible political theory nor, more importantly, a 
faithful rendering of the American constitutional tradition. 
A categorical rejection of the idea of slavery in modern political dis-
course may throw out the baby with the bathwater. The fact that at pre-
sent only so-called fringe elements in American political discourse are 
willing to connect concerns about overweening government power to 
slavery and antirepublicanism should be cause for sorrow, not disdain. It 
shows how far removed basic themes of American democracy are from 
the discussion of “reasonable” people. Slavery as tyranny and unjust dom-
ination, either at the hand of public or private power, is an idea with 
deep roots in the American political tradition. The connection between 
slavery and threats to republicanism is important, particularly in a world 
of deep political corruption, unresponsive and dysfunctional govern-
ment, and growing inequalities of wealth that in turn make government 
increasingly alienated from the concerns of any but the wealthiest and 
most powerful interests in society.180 As Larry Bartels has concluded in a 
book-length study of responsiveness in American democracy, the degree 
to which politicians respond to the policy preferences of citizens is highly 
                                                 
179. Transcript of Oral Argument at 80, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
(No. 11-400), decided sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (emphasis added).  
180. For a recent cri de coeur, see Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money 
Corrupts Congress—and a Plan To Stop It (2011) (arguing for campaign finance reform 
to prevent political corruption). 
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correlated to citizens’ income.181 Politicians are pretty good at respond-
ing to the policy preferences of the very rich, and virtually ignore the 
preferences of the poorest Americans.182 This has had self-reinforcing 
effects: Greater inequality in the United States has led to increasing unre-
sponsiveness by politicians to the interests of poor and working-class 
Americans, which in turn has led to more income inequality, and so 
on.183 American revolutionaries had a name for a system in which distant 
governments made arbitrary decisions that were unresponsive and un-
concerned with the interests of the governed: They called it slavery. And, 
as this Essay has shown, social movements in the nineteenth century were 
sometimes more honest than Americans today in recognizing unfreedom 
in bedrock institutions of market and family and daring to call this un-
freedom slavery. 
This is not to claim that American history would have been miracu-
lously transformed for the better if Americans took seriously the found-
ing generation’s conception of “slavery.” But, at the very least, it is possi-
ble that American political rhetoric would be different and that certain 
issues would be on the table for discussion in different ways. Among 
other things, it might then be possible to read the Thirteenth 
Amendment aspirationally to abolish many different forms of antirepub-
lican domination and involuntary servitude, without being limited by the 
specific examples in the minds of the Reconstruction framers. To an 
astonishing degree, the black letter law of the Thirteenth Amendment is 
a parody of originalist particularism. As noted at the beginning of this 
Essay, modern Americans would never stand for such crabbed readings 
of “speech” or “searches” and “seizures,” much less “equal protection” or 
“due process.” An alternate tradition of constitutional interpretation 
might have made—and might still make—the Thirteenth Amendment a 
truly vital part of the Constitution instead of relegating it to the dustbin 
of history. Chattel slavery may be gone in the United States, but the prob-
lems of slavery and republicanism that moved American colonists to revo-
lution are still very much alive. 
                                                 
181. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded 
Age 286 (2008); see also Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Ine-
quality Crisis and What We Can Do About It (2012). 
182. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 253, 275, 286 (testing this hypothesis in context 
of U.S. Senate); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 Pub. 
Opinion Q. 778, 794 (2005) (“[I]nfluence over actual policy outcomes appears to be re-
served almost exclusively for those at the top of the income distribution.”). 
183. See Bartels, supra note 181, at 286 (noting “the potential for a debilitating 
feedback cycle linking the economic and political realms”).  
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